

## **DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

TO: Steven Stokes, Technical Director  
FROM: William Linzau and Rory Rauch, Site Representatives  
SUBJECT: Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending January 17, 2014

**Nuclear Facility Hazard Categorization:** NPO's Assistant Manager for Nuclear Safety and Engineering sent a letter to B&W requesting a review of the hazard categorization (HC) of Buildings 9204-2, 9995, 9206 and 9720-5. The letter notes that these HC-2 facilities were categorized in the 1990s based on the hazardous materials inventory at that time and current material inventories should be evaluated to determine if the HC-2 level is still appropriate. As part of this review, NPO is also requesting that B&W determine what actions and associated cost would be necessary to remove nuclear material and potentially re-categorize these facilities. NPO asked for a report on the review in the next three months.

**Work Planning and Control (WP&C):** The Facilities, Infrastructure and Services (FI&S) and Production organizations have expanded the implementation of the 8-Week Rolling Window Planning and Scheduling (RWPS) process to cover maintenance activities in Buildings 9212 and 9215. The RWPS process was first implemented in Buildings 9204-2 and 9204-2E and is designed to improve work scheduling performance and in turn reduce the strain on WP&C processes due to emergent work requests and expedited planning (see 10/18/13 report). B&W managers are closely tracking the progress and implementation of this key initiative. One parameter being measured is the amount of unscheduled, or "add on," work that is performed. Recent data indicates that the majority of the maintenance work completed at Building 9212 during a specific week was "add on" work. FI&S management believes the amount of "add on" work will be reduced as personnel gain proficiency executing the RWPS process.

**Building 9204-2E:** Assembly/Quality Evaluation Production personnel were moving a weapon component using a holding fixture when the fixture lost its vacuum seal, allowing the piece to fall about four feet to the floor. There were no injuries or spread of contamination from the event. The vacuum is applied to the fixture through a "quick-release" hose connection that mates with a plug on the fixture. Process engineering personnel believe the loss of vacuum was caused by wear of the plug, which prevented a tight connection to the fitting. Pre-operational vacuum checks were conducted satisfactorily; therefore, the loss of vacuum most likely occurred during the movement of the component when the connection was disturbed.

**Radiological Control (RADCON):** This week, personnel assigned to Building 9204-4 entered an airborne radioactivity area (ARA) without the required respiratory protection. The RADCON technician had posted a portion of the Building 9204-4 complex as an ARA requiring respiratory protection over the weekend in advance of work to repair fire system piping that had been damaged during the freezing weather last week. The changed condition was communicated to the Shift Manager but not logged or communicated to the facility personnel on Monday morning. On Monday, personnel conducting normal facility rounds failed to notice the changed posting and entered the area without the required respiratory protection. Air sample results indicated no airborne radioactivity and the facility personnel had no measurable external contamination.